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Tracing Dao: A Comparison of Dao 道 in the Daoist Classics
and Derridean “Trace”
Steven Burik
Singapore Management University, Singapore, Singapore
ABSTRACT
This paper draws a comparison between Derrida’s “trace” and the
idea of dao in classical Daoism (Laozi and Zhuangzi). It is argued
that if dao is read in a non-metaphysical way, then the Derridean
idea of “trace” will show large overlaps with dao. I then show
how, despite some obvious diﬀerences, a “trace” reading of dao
enables a clearer understanding of dao that would see it not as a
metaphysical principle, ineﬀable but transcendent nonetheless,
but rather as an immanent working of the patterned processes
that makes up both the natural and human world. I also argue
that the notion of trace in classical Daoism (ji 跡, literally
footprints) or other characters denoting trace, are most often used
in a more traditional way (as pointing to a lost presence) and
hence are not useful for understanding what Derrida means with





This paper attempts to draw a comparison between Derrida’s idea of “trace” (in connec-
tion to the more famous notions of diﬀérance, supplement, and deconstruction) and the
idea of dao 道 in classical Daoism (the DaoDeJing and the Zhuangzi). I will explore
how far it is viable to apply Derrida’s thoughts with regard to “trace” to Daoism. I will
argue that if dao is read in a non-metaphysical way, then the Derridean idea of trace
will show large overlaps with dao. Yet, due to both historical and philosophical diﬀerences,
there will inevitably also be large diﬀerences between the two notions. I try to show how,
despite these diﬀerences, a “trace” reading of dao can help develop an understanding of
dao that would not necessarily see it as a metaphysical principle, ineﬀable but transcendent
nonetheless, but rather as an immanent working of the patterned processes that makes up
both the natural and human world.
Aside from this, I argue that the notion of trace in classical Daoism ( ji跡, literally foot-
prints) or other characters denoting trace, are most often used in a traditional way (as
pointing to a lost presence) and hence are not useful for understanding what Derrida
means with his notion of “trace.” This is so even in a profoundly non-metaphysical
thinker such as the neo-Daoist Guo Xiang. In Guo Xiang, we have a rather traditional
use of the term ji, as Guo uses it to describe not the ziran 自然, self-so process that
each thing is, but rather the traces or evidence we have of these processes. So “Yao” as
a name is the trace of the actual Yao, but this trace never actually leads us back to its
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origin. So, for Guo, traces are (as per traditional use and meaning) leftovers and derivatives
of something else. The diﬀerence in Guo is that this something else is, unlike for example
in Wang Bi, nothing metaphysical. The something else is literally nothing, not there; it has
come and gone, for each thing is spontaneously itself without the need of guidance from
outside. This means that although Guo uses the term ji in a traditional way, he does actu-
ally provide us with a solidly non-metaphysical reading of Daoism. Dao is literally
nothing, things just are, which means they come out of nothing by themselves, then
stay for a while, and then return to nothing again.
So, we have to be careful in our interpretation here. At one level, one could say that
Guo’s use of the idea of traces sounds very much like the metaphysical ideas on language,
with the living present voice as the real thing, and the written word as derivative and
wrong, but persisting where the voice has gone. However, Guo speaks in terms of
persons walking, and the footprints or traces they leave. The sages leaving the footprints
are gone, but their traces endure. On this level, Guo exhorts us to not follow the traces, not
imitate the sages or the traces that we have of them, but to forge our own way ahead, since
we can also never follow the actual sages, since they have left only traces and are no longer
present.
It is interesting in the context of this paper that on this level, for Guo, there is nothing
behind the traces. So, while the traces may not be the real thing, there is in the end no real
thing to follow, everything is ziran, self-so, and it is that realization that makes Guo reluc-
tant to posit anything else outside of the natural processes that make up our world. All is
ziran, so of itself, and the task at hand is to not fall for the traces, but to accomplish a dark
merging directly with how things are, which is “always in transformation,” and thus to
place no trust in the relative permanence of traces. But this use, although clearly, ada-
mantly, and unapologetically non-metaphysical, really has, as we shall see, very little in
common with Derrida’s idea of trace as diﬀérance, context, infrastructure, or interdepen-
dence. When Guo talks about independence and interdependence, it is to say that depen-
dence and mutual entanglement are really also ziran (Ziporyn 2003, 56), and that may be
the only connection to Derrida’s notion of trace that we can ﬁnd here, apart from the anti-
metaphysical stance both Derrida and Guo Xiang have assumed in denying a ﬁnal ground.
Things are not grounded, they just are.
This means that what Derrida understands by “trace” does not really follow the conven-
tional concept of trace we have, and that in Daoism the notion of trace does not really ﬁt
the Derridean trace, but that the notion of daomay be understood better by reading it with
Derrida’s “trace.” This is one of the reasons I have long been hesitant to compare the idea
of dao with Derrida’s ideas of “trace” or “tracing,” which has connotations with “play” and
“supplement,” not least because it seems that the two ideas are too far apart in history and
intellectual background to suggest any meaningful comparison. Yet, there are certain simi-
larities which should be obvious to anyone with more than a cursory understanding of
Daoism and Derrida. The processual emphasis of Daoist thought, with the central
notion of continuous change, is clearly sympathetic to Derrida’s understanding of trace
as the impossibility of closure. In other words, both Derrida and the Daoists seek to
convey a message of non-closure. In Derrida, the idea of the trace is one form this
message takes, and in Daoism dao can be understood as another way of trying to
convey this message. But of course, and here lies another important similarity; the convey-
ing of this message is itself fraught with dangers of closure, as language has the tendency to
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stabilize meanings, to “identify,” that is, to give a ﬁxed identity through distinctions, to
absolutize and to thereby deny processuality. Again, both Derrida and the Daoists are
acutely aware of this, and they seek, in their distinct ways, to inhabit this danger while
not succumbing to it. Derrida does this mostly by switching to diﬀerent concepts
within his work, by pointing to semantic variety, and by introducing new forms of con-
ceptuality, such as the term diﬀérance. In Daoism, it is also understood, in the words of
Ames and Hall, but which could equally apply to Derrida, that: “ﬁxed principles, closed
systems, the pretense of absolutes and initial origins are intellectually and practically suﬀo-
cating. Dogma, artiﬁciality, and ﬁnality close oﬀ the openness and fresh air of new direc-
tions in thought and action” (Ames and Hall 2003, 135). But both the Daoists and Derrida
recognize that we are necessarily dependent on such structures that are inherently averse
to openness, and try to play with this danger in similar ways.
Derrida
Let us start by considering in more detail what Derrida really means by this notion of
“trace.” The ﬁrst thing to note is that “trace” is used by Derrida in a long line of other
words, such as diﬀérance, supplement, iterability, and others, to denote his continuous
challenges to the metaphysics of presence. Derrida starts talking about trace early on in
his work, and initially the concept is used in his work on signiﬁcation. Building on the
Saussurean idea that language is based on diﬀerences, he wants us “to consider every
process of signiﬁcation as a formal play of diﬀerences. That is, of traces” (Derrida 1981,
26). The fact that signs, words, can only function by being diﬀerent from other signs,
leads Derrida to say that
no element can function as a sign without reference to another element which itself is not
simply present. This interweaving results in each “element”—phoneme or grapheme—
being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or
system. This interweaving, this textile, is the text produced only in the transformation of
another text. Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere
ever simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, diﬀerences and traces of traces.
(1981, 26)
Accordingly, the idea of trace denotes the fact that signiﬁcation only works on the basis
of “interweaving” or “texture,” but “trace” is not limited to signiﬁcation. Neither is the idea
of “text” or écriture limited to language. In Limited Inc., Derrida says that écriture, or “text”
as he understands it
does not suspend reference—to history, to the world, to reality, to being, and especially not to
the other, since to say of history, of the world, of reality, that they always appear in an experi-
ence, hence in a movement of interpretation which contextualizes them according to a
network of diﬀerences and hence of referral to the other, is surely to recall that alterity (diﬀer-
ence) is irreducible. Diﬀérance is a reference and vice versa. (1988, 137, italics in original)
A bit further he asserts a similar idea when he explains what he means by “text”:
What I call “text” implies all the structures called “real,” “economic,” “historical,” socio-insti-
tutional, in short: all possible referents. … That does not mean that all referents are sus-
pended, denied … but it does mean that every referent, all reality has the structure of a
diﬀerential trace … . (Derrida 1988, 148)
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In fact, Derrida seeks to establish that trace really conveys the same idea as diﬀérance:
[diﬀérance]… is “older” than the ontological diﬀerence or than the truth of being. When it
has this age it can be called the play of the trace. The play of a trace which no longer belongs
to the horizon of being, but whose play transports and encloses the meaning of being: the play
of the trace, or the diﬀérance, which has no meaning and is not. Which does not belong.
(1982, 22)
In another quote, Derrida again makes the connection between diﬀérance and trace:
“Diﬀérance is the systematic play of diﬀerences, of the traces of diﬀerences, of the
spacing by means of which elements are related to each other” (1981, 27, italics in original).
Thus, we can say that the notion of trace is meant to convey Derrida’s idea that the world
consists of a play of diﬀerences, and that each so-called identity will only be such through
both diﬀerentiation from other things and recognition of the traces of those other things in
it, the interweaving. This entails a relational view of becoming instead of Being, in which
things are never the pure or ideal substances, identities or essences on their own, but only
ever become something by “incorporating” the “always already there” of otherness
inserted into a self, or subject, or identity. That is why Derrida can say: “the trace is the
erasure of selfhood, of one’s own presence” (1978, 289). Trace is thus a notion which
reminds us that the metaphysics of presence is shortsighted in thinking in terms of
subject and object, but that such perceived distinct things are always already intertwined.
In an interview posted on the Critical Theory website, Derrida says the following: “In order
to access the present as such, there must be an experience of the trace. A rapport to some-
thing else, to the Other.… In everything there is the trace, the experience of a return to
something else” (Derrida, n.d.). It is important to note that this something else, this
necessarily preceding experience of otherness, is not a transcendent origin, but a realiz-
ation of the continuous necessity of contextualization, of constant referencing to other-
ness, or what Ames and Hall have termed the ars contextualis. Although they
understand this ars contextualis mainly as a comparative method, they also explain it as
a way of understanding the notion of a self in Classical China: “the focus-ﬁeld model
results from understanding one’s relation to the world to be constituted by acts of contex-
tualization.… By deﬁnition, the focal self cannot be independent” (Ames and Hall 1998,
43). Although in highly diﬀerent contexts, both Derrida and the Daoists then seek to make
us realize that we are contextual and situational creatures at our core, and that nothing we
do to undo that contextuality will be successful. We can provisionally make distinctions,
halt the process, but eventually it will catch up and undo that artiﬁcial ﬁxation. Both
Derrida and the Daoists then urge us not to lend too much importance to such distinc-
tion-making.
Trace is also used in another way to question the idea of a metaphysical principle, a
transcendence that would guide or rule the world. Like Heidegger’s Being, Derrida uses
terms such as diﬀérance and trace to argue for the non-existence of such metaphysical
principles or higher powers. Trace, thus, is nothing. By its very deﬁnition, the trace is
not something present in and of itself, but is always the trace of something else:
“Always diﬀering and deferring, the trace is never as it is in the presentation of itself. It
erases itself in presenting itself, muﬄes itself in resonating, like the a writing itself, inscrib-
ing its pyramid in diﬀérance” (Derrida 1982, 23). Explicitly, the notion of trace denies the
possibility of essentiality. Of course, our normal understanding of trace would be that
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there is something behind or before the trace that actually left the trace in the ﬁrst place. A
trace would in this understanding point to an origin. But Derrida does not understand
trace in this “normal” way, and he strategically turns the trace into the origin. This
paradox of reversal is of course not lost on Derrida but employed deliberately to upset
the notion of origin itself: “the trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general.
Which amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in
general. The trace is the diﬀérance which opens appearance and signiﬁcation” (1976,
65). This is what makes Derrida’s thought diﬀerent from negative theology: it is not
that we can only see the traces of a transcendent or metaphysical God or principle, but
never this God or principle itself. Traces are not to be understood here in a negative theol-
ogy fashion, in which all we have is traces of the unknowable origin, but then we continue
to postulate that origin nonetheless. In Derrida’s world, traces never refer back to any
simple or pure origin; traces are only such that they refer to other traces, and there is
no stepping beyond or back from this process. There is nothing but traces:
The trace is not only the disappearance of origin—within the discourse that we sustain and
according to the path that we follow it means that the origin did not even disappear, that it
was never constituted except reciprocally by a non-origin, the trace, which thus becomes the
origin of the origin. From then on, to wrench the concept of the trace from the classical
scheme, which would derive it from a presence or from an originary non-trace and which
would make of it an empirical mark, one must indeed speak of an originary trace or
arche-trace. Yet we know that that concept destroys its name and that, if all begins with
the trace, there is above all no originary trace. (Derrida 1976, 61)
For Derrida, there is no mystery beyond the interweaving workings of the world. And,
we can see dao in a similar fashion. Although some aura of mysticism is always appended
to Daoism, such mysticism (if it even exists) and the idea of dao need not be seen as point-
ing to a metaphysical or transcendent principle. There is no outside. Dao is just a style-
name for all the myriad things (wanwu萬物) going about their business in a quasi-pat-
terned way. There is no need to have recourse to transcendent principles. Derrida’s trace is
exactly the denial of the possibility of ever ﬁnding pure transcendence and dao can be
understood likewise. There is no pure origin, there is just the ongoing process of the
world, where regularity and order go hand in hand with change, unpredictability, and
novelty. Traces of otherness and change are always upsetting that dreamt-of pure pres-
ence. This idea is far from novel. Guo Xiang, the neo-Daoist, already argued such a pos-
ition. And in the words of A. C. Graham: “In the Chinese cosmos all things are
interdependent, without transcendent principles by which to explain them or a transcen-
dent origin from which they derive” (1990, 287). In this way, the notion of dao can be read
in a non-metaphysical way.
Yet, somehow, both in Derrida and in Daoism, trace or dao is also understood as being
the condition of possibility for all to exist as it does:
What the thought of the trace has taught us is that it could not be simply submitted to the
onto-phenomenological question of essence. The trace is nothing, it is not an entity, it
exceeds the question what is? and contingently makes it possible. (1976, 75)
Dao also is not clearly an outside, transcendental. It is “the workings” of the various
wanwu, and nothing else. “Trace” and dao so understood are equally arguments against
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the metaphysics of presence and transcendence, because they resist duality and opposition,
and argue for interdependence or relationality. Both go against the thinking of inside and
outside. There is an interesting passage in Limited Inc. that could make us fully understand
and appreciate this profound relationality in Derrida’s thinking. Expounding on the infa-
mous “There is no outside of the text,” Derrida says that what he was really saying with
this is “that nothing exists outside context … , but also that the limit of the frame or
the border of the context always entails a clause of non-closure. The outside penetrates
and thus determines the inside” (1988, 152–153, italics in original). Context itself is con-
stitutive of any identity, and as a context, it can never be closed oﬀ, it is structurally and
inherently open, since it is nothing more or less than “the entire ‘real-history-of-the-
world’” (Derrida 1988, 136). If there is anything that is the “condition of possibility” of
the world, it is the world itself understood as contextuality, interweaving.
To sum up, trace is a notion used by Derrida to refer to the diﬀerential workings of the
world, where reality is structured in relationality and not in distinct entities or subjects and
objects. Rodolphe Gashé has used the term “infrastructure” in this context in his Tain of
the Mirror (Gasché 1988, 147–154), and I believe this term is pertinent to understanding
the similarity of trace and dao. Both point to intrinsic relationality, in which things/events/
processes are only such in relation to other things/events/processes. Both point to continu-
ous transformation without recourse to a pure original or pure end. An infrastructure does
not depend on anything else, it is just a network of relative stability, but meant to connect
and be open to change and inherently ﬂuent. It has structure, but that structure is not com-
pletely ﬁxed and is contextual.
But let us now see if we can corroborate this interpretation with readings from the Dao-
DeJing and the Zhuangzi.
Daoism
Let me reiterate that my concern in this paper is not the use of the classical Chinese char-
acters for “trace” such as ji跡, although it appears frequently, especially in the Zhuangzi.
As David Chai has mentioned:
During the formative period of Chinese philosophy (8th – 4th C. BCE), the word for trace – ji
跡, which can be translated as mark, remains, vestige, or footprint – was relatively common-
place. Although the character ji appears at least once in every known text from the period,
none can match the Zhuangzi in terms of volume of usage. (2017, 247)
But the character(s) for “trace” are mostly used in their standard and traditional
meaning of pointing to some other presence. Instead of looking at the “trace” characters,
I will see if we can read a similarity to how Derrida understands “trace” in the DaoDeJing
and the Zhuangzi. Let us start with the DaoDeJing.
Daodejing
Of course, there are many interpretations of classical Daoism that do see it as a philosophy
closely related to some form of metaphysics. Wang Bi is an example, and there are cur-
rently also scholars who see Daoism as inherently and profoundly metaphysical. But we
need not understand it that way. A. C. Graham has already noticed similarities between
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dao as used in the DaoDeJing and Derrida’s notion of trace: “Perhaps Lao-tzu’s Way is
how the Trace will look to us when we are no longer haunted by the ghost of that trans-
cendental Reality the death of which Derrida proclaims” (Graham 1989, 228). Graham
recognized that, although the context for each was very diﬀerent, there is a close
kinship between the strategies of reversal in the DaoDeJing and in Derrida’s work:
The aﬃnity of Lao-tzu and Derrida is that both use reversal to deconstruct chains in which A
is traditionally preferred to B, and in breaking down the dichotomy oﬀer us a glimpse of
another line which runs athwart it – for Lao-tzu the Way, for Derrida the Trace. (1989, 227)
In more detail, the ﬁrst similarity obviously lies in the use and function of language.
Ames and Hall claim that “the Chinese language is not logocentric. Words do not
name essences. Rather, they indicate always-transitory processes and events” (2001, 16).
Western languages may be logocentric, but that is exactly what Derrida tried to overcome
or turn against itself. The fact that language tends to substantialize, reify, leads Ames and
Hall to say:
We can easily and at real expense overdetermine the continuity within the life process as
some underlying and unchanging foundation. Such linguistic habits can institutionalize
and enforce an overly static vision of the world, and in so doing, deprive both language
and life of their creative possibilities. (2003, 45)
This is why Ames and Hall claim that, for the Daoist, “The precise referential language
of denotation and description is to be replaced by a language of ‘deference’ in which mean-
ings both allude to and defer to one another in a shifting ﬁeld of signiﬁcances” (2001, 10).
This language of “deference” that Ames and Hall discuss is a language which refuses the
reiﬁcation and substance-thinking characteristic of classical Western philosophy. In a long
quotation of Ames and Hall:
A misunderstanding of the nature of language has the potential to promote the worst mis-
conceptions about the ﬂux and ﬂow of experience in which we live our lives. There is an
obvious tension between the unrelenting processual nature of experience and the function
of language to separate out, isolate, and arrest elements within it. To the extent that it is
the nature of language to arrest the process of change and discipline it into a coherent,
predictable order, there is the likelihood that an uncritical application of language might
persuade us that our world is of a more stable and necessary character than it really is.
The assumption, for example, that there is a literal language behind the metaphorical can
introduce notions of permanence, necessity, and objectivity into our worldview that can
have deleterious consequences. (2003, 113)
This does not of course mean that reference is completely denied. We can still tempor-
arily ﬁxate things, as they do display some endurance and persistence. Yet that persistence
should never lead us to completely distinguish them from other things. And this is also
what the idea of trace is. As we have seen, Derrida himself also acknowledges the idea
of reference, but seeks in similar fashion to put it in place, in context. A comparable
idea is present in the DaoDeJing. Neither Derrida nor the DaoDeJing are against language,
but they are against its uncritical use. In Chapter 32, it is said: “When we start to regulate
the world we introduce names. But once names have been assigned, we must also know
when to stop. Knowing when to stop is how to avoid danger” (Ames and Hall 2003,
127). The Daoist seeks to move from language as referring to deferring. But to defer
can be read in two ways: as deferment, postponement, it has connotations with trace,
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but as deference or yielding to authority is has not. Confucianism may be more about def-
erence, but Daoism in its core is surely not deference to man-made rules; it only seeks def-
erence to nature tian天. But it does deal with deferment in language, as the reifying and
substantializing aspect of language is constantly criticized.
In the DaoDeJing such an understanding of language as provisional also ﬂows over into
the rest of the world. When there is no permanence in language, then we should not expect
any permanence in the world. And we do know that Daoism is primarily a philosophy of
change. In the words of Ames and Hall: “The Daoist does not posit the existence of some
permanent reality behind appearances, some unchanging substratum, some essential
deﬁning aspect behind the accidents of change. Rather, there is just the ceaseless and
usually cadenced ﬂow of experience” (Ames and Hall 2003, 14). This is corroborated in
Chapter 34: “Way-making is an easy-ﬂowing stream which can run in any direction.
With all things accomplished and the work complete, it does not assume any proprietary
claim” (Ames and Hall 2003, 130). Dao is not a transcendent origin, but the infrastructure
itself. Or in Ames and Hall’s language:
the natural cosmology of classical China does not entail a single-ordered cosmos, but invokes
an understanding of a ‘world’ or dao constituted by a myriad of unique particulars, ‘the ten
thousand things.’ Dao is, thus, the process of the world itself. (1998, 245)
And this is, of course, read in Chapter 62: “Way-making (dao) is the ﬂowing together of all
things (wanwu)” (Ames and Hall 2003, 173). Ames and Hall comment on this passage:
“Way-making as the ﬂowing together of all things is properly prized as the enabling
context that makes everything possible” (Ames and Hall 2003, 174). In yet other terms:
Dao is not organic in the sense that a single pattern or telos could be said to characterize its
processes. It is not a whole, but many such wholes. It is not the superordinate One to which
the Many reduce. Its order is not rational or logical, but aesthetic, which is but to say that
there is no transcending pattern determining the existence or eﬃcacy of the order. The
order is a consequence of the particulars comprising the totality of existing things. (Ames
and Hall 1998, 245)
The fact that both contextuality and the impossibility of a reduction to an outside are
realized means that “for the Daoist, there is an intoxicating bottomlessness to any particu-
lar event in our experience” (Ames and Hall 2003, 18). Like Derrida’s trace, such an under-
standing of dao denies closure and celebrates the experience of otherness and
contextuality. In Daoism, this recognition of “infrastructure” ﬂows over to the human
realm and how we should act in it. Terms such as wuwei 無為 and ziran 自然 are con-
sidered relational at the core. As Ames and Hall claim: “Spontaneous action is a mirroring
response. As such, it is action that accommodates the ‘other’ to whom one is responding. It
takes the other on its own terms. Such spontaneity involves recognizing the continuity
between oneself and the other … ” (2003, 24).
We know that in Daoism opposites are always considered relational in the ﬁrst place.
Daoism does not recognize the strict dichotomies that Western philosophy has always
prided itself on. Xin 心 shows the interrelatedness of knowing and emotions. In
Chapter 42, the discussion of Yin-yang陰陽 dichotomies conveys the idea that everything
becomes its other, that there is a constant processuality.
This also means that the notion of dao itself, as Chapter 1 says, cannot be pinned down.
In Chapter 14, it is said of dao: “Ever so tangled, it deﬁes discrimination and reverts again
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to indeterminacy. This is what is called the form of the formless and the image of indeter-
minacy. This is what is called the vague and the indeﬁnite” (Ames and Hall 2003, 96).
Commenting on this passage, Ames and Hall state that dao “will not yield itself up to
our most basic categories of location and determination: bright and dark, inside and
outside, subject and object, one and many” (2003, 97). So, things are never clear and dis-
tinct, there are always traces of otherness involved. In Ames and Hall’s language: “The pro-
cessive and synergistic forces at work in way-making render the language of discreteness
and closure inappropriate” (2003, 99). The same ideas are expressed in chapter 21: “As for
the process of way-making, it is ever so indeﬁnite and vague” (Ames and Hall 2003, 107).
And it is exactly this tendency to try to achieve clarity and distinctness at all costs that
Derrida’s notion of “trace” also challenges.
But since there is a tendency, in language but maybe also in people, to think in hierar-
chies and be one-sided (and this, in the form of the Confucian morality, is really what the
DaoDeJing is arguing against), Chapter 28 warns us to guard the opposite, guard the other-
ness in oneself and in the world. This guarding entails a reluctance to draw sharp distinc-
tions in favor of continuity between opposites. And this is also found in chapters 36 and
40, where the notion of returning is employed as a warning not to isolate. And this is
where the DaoDeJing seems to have an edge over Derrida, who ceaselessly points out
the problems, but is always criticized for not providing the solutions. The DaoDeJing
does give us some guidance in the form of exhortations to pay proper attention to this rela-
tionality to avoid problems. For example, chapters 63 and 64 teach us that awareness of the
trace-nature allows us to nip problems in the bud.
Zhuangzi
Let me remind the reader once more that we are not looking at the notion of trace ji, or
other related characters with the meaning of “trace.” As in the DaoDeJing, where it is
said in Chapter 27 that “able travellers leave no ruts or tracks along the way” (Ames
and Hall 2003, 119), the notion of trace ji 跡 appears quite often in the Zhuangzi.
For example, in Chapter 4: “To leave oﬀ making footprints [that is, when walking] is
easy, never to walk on the ground is hard” (Graham 2001, 69). And as brieﬂy mentioned
at the start of this paper, we even see the profoundly anti-metaphysical Neo-Daoist Guo
Xiang use the term “traces” as a central idea, but in a traditional fashion, connecting
tracelessness with the Sage and the traces left with the kind of knowledge that is to be
discarded. Such uses of these notions can easily deceive us into thinking that in
Daoism the notion of trace is used in a rather straightforwardly metaphysical way.
There is “good” presence, and “bad” traces, a bit like Derrida’s assessment of the privi-
lege of the voice over writing.
So instead of looking at traces, I will argue that in the Zhuangzi, a similar thinking is
present as that suggested by the Derridean interpretation of “trace.” Let us read some pas-
sages where this becomes apparent. One of the key ideas the Zhuangzi seeks to convey is
that nothing is ﬁxed, that continuous change is the only reality. In Chapter 6, it is said that
“our understanding can be in the right only by virtue of a relation of dependence on some-
thing, and what it depends on is always particularly unﬁxed” (Ziporyn 2009, 39). And that
is why, the Zhuangzi says in Chapter 2 that “the Way has never known boundaries, speech
has no constancy.… Those who discriminate fail to see” (Watson 2003, 39). Hence, the
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mistrust of language as providing permanence and order is present in the Zhuangzi as it is
in Derrida. Discrimination, naming, or deeming something to be A rather than B, can only
lead to a false sense of security, closure, and it is indeed this closure that Zhuangzi argues
against: “Their dividing is formation, their formation is dissolution; all things whether
forming or dissolving in reverting interchange and are deemed to be one” (Graham
2001, 53). And in a passage related to this, it is said that “what goes on being hateful in
dividing is that it makes the division into a completed set. The reason why the completion
goes on being hateful is that it makes everything there is into a completed set” (Graham
2001, 103). Once this knowledge is apparent, and we become aware of the tendency of rep-
resentational thinking to closure, to turn everything into solidiﬁed “objects,” we could,
according to Zhuangzi, hopefully return to being like the people of old:
The men of old, their knowledge had arrived at something: at what had it arrived? There were
some who thought there had not yet begun to be things—the utmost, the exhaustive, there is
no more to add. The next thought there were things but there had not yet begun to be
borders. The next thought there were borders to them but there had not yet begun to be
“That’s it, that’s not.” The lighting up of “That’s it, that’s not” is the reason why the Way
is ﬂawed. (Graham 2001, 54)
Instead of discriminating and isolating one thing from another, the Zhuangzi recog-
nizes that “Without an Other there is no Self, without Self no choosing one thing
rather than another” (Graham 2001, 51). It is not that it is impossible to temporarily
isolate something from something else, but like the notion of trace, relationality, or the
idea that there is unity in diﬀerentiality before diﬀerent things as separate entities, is
given primacy: “What is It is also Other, what is Other is also It” (Graham 2001, 53).
Zhuangzi also recognizes that we are perspectival creatures, and that any one perspec-
tive necessarily leaves out something. Zhuangzi even recognizes that his own sayings are
not ﬁnal, and that his perspective on the Confucians and Mohists is exactly that, yet
another perspective. But the message behind this, is in the words of Ames and Hall:
“The world is a complex set of processes of transformation, never at rest. Wuhua, ‘the
transformation of things,’ means that one can never pretend that what we seek to hold
onto, has any permanent status” (1998, 54–55). This means that, like Derrida, Zhuangzi
seeks an openness and responsiveness to otherness, continually, and a realization that
any attempt at halting the process or at reiﬁcation will result in not appropriately respond-
ing to otherness, and in denying the inherent process nature of the world.
Zhuangzi also tells us that there is really no metaphysical principle guiding all this
change. There is never really any possibility to move beyond the trace or transformation
structure:
There is a beginning. There is a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There is a not yet begin-
ning to be a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There is being. There is nonbeing. There is a
not yet beginning to be nonbeing. There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be
nonbeing. Suddenly there is being and nonbeing. But between this being and nonbeing, I
don’t really know which is being and which is nonbeing. (Watson 2003, 38)
There is always another layer of context to be found. We cannot and should not seek to
go beyond the world in any way, it is both unnecessary and unproductive, unhelpful. All
we need to know is what Zhuangzi himself realizes in one of the stories about him in which
he is pursuing a magpie bird in the woods, and that is that “it is inherent in things that they
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are ties to each other, that one kind calls up another” (Graham 2001, 118). So it is not so
much that all things are one, but the sage treats them as one, as inseparable in the end.
There is a clear continuity between ourselves and the rest of the world, in fact speaking
of ourselves and the rest of the world might already be incorrect and reﬂective of
exactly the attitude that Zhuangzi seeks to overcome. Both the idea of trace and of dao
try to highlight this continuity, although in diﬀerent contexts, and with ultimately
diﬀerent aims. But both try to convince us that separateness, discreteness, and a strict
objectivity that sees things as bordered, are not a good reﬂection of the way we are in
the world, and that instead the focus should be on contextuality or interweaving,
infrastructure.
And that is why the only acceptable language is “spillover saying” (Graham 2001, 26),
or “reckless” words (Watson 2003, 42). Like Derrida, who keeps inventing new words or
using words in diﬀerent meanings, under erasure, “spillover saying” does not pretend to
have any permanence, and reckless words risk losing meaning (or actually seek not to
ﬁx meaning), because their result is that for the sage “all the ten thousand things are
what they are, and thus they enfold each other” (Watson 2003, 42). Again, what this
means is that closure is denied in favor of transformation. And this is why the Zhuangzi
calls dao “‘at home where it intrudes.’ What is ‘at home where it intrudes’ is that which
comes about only where it intrudes into the place of something else” (Graham 2001, 87).
This is exactly what Derrida’s trace also seeks to convey. It upsets the homeliness of the
ideal of presence and fullness; it intrudes into the place thatwas supposed to belong to some-
thing else and to make that thing “clear and distinct.” It upsets boundaries and hierarchies.
The kind of people who understand this are “the sort that roams beyond the guidelines”
(Graham 2001, 89). The sorting that evens things out is exactly the overturning of hierar-
chy and dichotomy that Derrida’s trace also suggests. If there is no such thing as an origin,
there is no such thing as a hierarchy between the origin and its surrogate oﬀshoots. And
that also ties in with the fact that Zhuangzi is reluctant to do the thing Classical Chinese
thinkers mostly do, appeal to an identiﬁable tradition and/or past as the origin to which to
return. He also seeks to overturn or deny or undo the dichotomy between tian and man.
“For the sage there has never begun to be Heaven, never begun to be man” (Graham 2001,
111). Dao, or tian understood as nature, the world, is really the self-generating world
inclusive of humans.
The Zhuangzi does not seek order behind the changing appearances, but seeks to
mirror the endless tracing of a processual world. In the Daoist world, order is indeﬁnite,
non-reducible, continuous change. Such a concept of order is, at the very least, closer to
Derrida’s notion of trace than it would be to any notion of a metaphysical principle.
And the Daoist adept would reﬂect this. When discussing the genuine person in the
Zhuangzi, Ames and Hall note that
In the Shuowen lexicon, zhen is classiﬁed under the radical bi (匕), the original form of hua
(化), ‘to transform, to change to,’ so whatever ‘genuine’ might mean, it does entail a process
of transformation.… Similarly, escape from the world and ascent to the heavens as an
immortal is anathema to Zhuangzi’s notion of total integration in the process of the ‘trans-
formation of things (wuhua (物化))’. (1998, 163)
The zhenren真人 or genuine person would be exactly the one who would recognize and
live up to the trace or transformational nature of the world and herself. There is no identity
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without diﬀerence, no subject without object, and the Daoist tries to actively put herself in
the other’s position, on the assumption that this other is actually not really other at all, but
part of a continuously changing world which is both forming and dissolving identities all
the time. The Daoist has no need for a metaphysical ground for this changing world.
Conclusion
I have had only a modest aim with this paper, and that has been to argue that for those
who are not convinced that Daoism is a metaphysical philosophy, Derrida’s notion of
trace oﬀers resources for understanding the notion of dao as non-metaphysical. I hope
to have shown that although in the Daoist classics the use of characters meaning
“trace” or something similar usually follows the conventional meaning of referring to
something behind or before that trace, we do in fact ﬁnd a lot of evidence suggesting
such a non-metaphysical understanding of dao in relation to Derrida’s trace. And this,
in turn, is meant to facilitate a reading of classical Daoism through the lens of Derrida’s
trace, hopefully clarifying both more through their interaction.
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